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Abstract
Impact assessments of policy interventions on agricultural commodity
prices are carried out by international organizations using nationwide
measures which overlook the effects of spatial heterogeneity in
incomplete markets. We introduce a multi-step methodology to build
spatially-disaggregated nominal rates of protection in a data-scarce
environment and test it along the maize value chain in Uganda. Results
confirm that the spatial dispersion of farmers plays a key role in
determining heterogeneity in nominal rates of protection. This finding has
far-reaching policy implications: i) the assumption of a nationally-
representative market pathway is unrealistic; ii) pan-national interventions
may exacerbate, rather than reduce, price distortions.
This work was conducted in the context of Monitoring and Analyzing Food and Agricultural Policies (MAFAP)
Program implemented by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and financially supported by the Bill and
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1. Introduction 
The international community regularly monitors the pattern of agricultural (dis)incentives to 
track changes in domestic policies, anticipate their effects on world prices and support 
evidence-based policymaking at national and global level1. These measures – such as the 
nominal rate of protection (NRP) – are derived from price comparisons and frequently used to 
assess the impact of policy interventions on outcomes such as market structure, productivity, 
welfare and agricultural output composition as well as food security (Magrini et al., 2017; 
Laroche-Dupraz & Huchet-Bourdon 2016). However, mainly due to data scarcity in developing 
countries, current measures overlook spatial heterogeneity by relying on the non-trivial 
assumption that there is a nationally representative market pathway. In competitive systems, 
spatial arbitrage should lower these price differences across markets to the level of transaction 
costs. Yet, the literature provides substantive evidence of imperfect spatial price transmission 
in developing countries due to factors such as market power, marketing costs, government 
interventions and asymmetric information (Abdulai, 2000; Fafchamps and Hill 2005; Renkow 
et al., 2004; Osborne, 2005).  
Our aim is to reconcile the evidence of spatial heterogeneity with the policymakers’ need for 
synthetic indicators on agricultural price incentives. We thus i) propose a multi-step procedure 
to build regionally-disaggregated NRPs in a data-scarce environment; and ii) test it along the 
maize value chain in Uganda. This is a pilot study that can be easily extended to other crops 
and countries. Uganda is an ideal case study since it is a primarily agriculture-based country 
and a completely liberalized market. The choice of maize is motivated by its dichotomous role 
as a food security crop for the country and as an export commodity to the East Africa 
Community. 
Results confirm that the spatial dispersion of farmers plays a key role in determining 
heterogeneity in NRPs for maize farmers in Uganda. This finding has far-reaching policy 
implications because it shows that: i) the implicit assumption of a nationally-representative 
market pathway is unrealistic; ii) pan-national policy interventions may exacerbate, rather than 
reduce, price distortions along the chain.  
2. Methodology and data 
This analysis extends the approach developed by the FAO Monitoring and Analysing Food and 
Agricultural Policies (MAFAP) programme (Barreiro-Hurle and Witwer, 2013). Unlike other 
methodologies, MAFAP indicators account for vertical heterogeneity, i.e. price differentials at 
two points along the value chain. MAFAP computes NRPs by comparing observed domestic 
prices with reference prices for a set of agricultural commodities and countries. Reference 
prices are proxied using international prices, considered free of influence from domestic 
                                                          
1As of today, four major international organizations (IOs) monitor agricultural policy incentives at country level 
on a continuing basis: OECD with the Producer and Consumer Support Estimates database; the World Bank with 
the Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database; the FAO with the MAFAP database; the Inter-American 
Development Bank with the Producer Support Estimate database. Recently, under the coordination of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute, these IOs created the International Consortium for Measuring the 
Policy Environment for Agriculture, with the aim of harmonizing and increasing the quality and coverage of the 
available measures (http://www.ag-incentives.org/).  
policies and markets and adjusted by access costs (transportation, handling and processing, 
profit margins and taxes) incurred along a pre-defined market corridor. Observed domestic 
prices are compared to reference prices at two points along the value chain, the farm gate 
(where farmers sell the commodity) and the point of competition (where domestic products 
compete with identical products at world prices). Exploiting gaps between reference and 
observed prices, MAFAP calculates two different measures of NRPs: one at the wholesale 
market and one at the farm gate. However, due to their construction and data constraints, these 
NRPs are homogeneous within-country, i.e. only a single NRP is provided for each country-
year, and this measure is assumed to be nationally representative. In short, MAFAP accounts 
for vertical heterogeneity, but still overlooks spatial heterogeneity. 
To overcome these limitations, we compute within-country disaggregated measures of 
household NRPs, by extending this methodology through a multi-step procedure. First, we 
exploit the spatial dispersion of farmers provided by household-level data to obtain 
differentiated measures of access costs from the farm gate to the main wholesale market. 
Second, we compute access costs between these regional wholesale markets and their 
respective border. Third, both access costs are subtracted from Free on Board (FOB) prices to 
compute household-specific reference prices at the farm-gate level (RFGPs) for the exported 
commodity: �ܨܩ�ℎ� = ��� −  ������� −  ��ܨܩℎ�                                                         (1) 
where the subscripts h, b, m and t stand, respectively, for households, borders, wholesale 
markets and years; ��� stands for the benchmark FOB price; �������  are the observed access 
costs from each point of competition to the border; ��ܨܩℎ� are the observed access costs, 
separately calculated for each household, from their farm gate to the respective point of 
competition. In the final step, we obtain household-level measures of price gaps (PG) by 
subtracting RFGPs from the observed farm-gate prices (FGPs): 
   �ܩℎ� =  ܨܩ�ℎ� − �ܨܩ�ℎ�                                                  (2) 
Household-specific NRPs are then estimated as: ���ℎ� =  �ீℎ��ிீ�ℎ�                                                         (3) 
Lastly, we aggregate the indicator at the desired administrative level taking the average. In this 
way, we get rid of the bias due to household heterogeneity and provide a useful policy measure 
at a meaningful unit of aggregation.  
Data for this study come from five sources. Household and agricultural data are taken from the 
World Bank LSMS-ISA surveys (2009-2010; 2010-2011; 2011-2012), Free-on-Board prices 
are from UN Comtrade, Points of Competition are selected using FEWSNET Production and 
Trade flow maps (see Figure A.1), information on marketing costs excluding transport are from 
the MAFAP AgIncentives database and lastly, estimates of unit transport costs are derived from 
the World Bank (2009). Table A.1 in the Appendix reports detailed information on the core 
variables employed.  
3. Results and conclusions 
Table A.2 in the Appendix presents measures of the regionally-disaggregated indicators for 
each year in our sample.  Figure 1 below reports the box plots of average household NRPs for 
the entire period under investigation (2009-2012) disaggregated by Ugandan regions: Central, 
Western, Eastern and Northern. The main feature is the evidence of strong heterogeneity both 
between- and within-region. Remarkably, in some cases, there is also heterogeneity in sign. 
These results contradict the single pathway assumption and emphasize the role of farmers’ 
geographic dispersion in determining price distortions and imperfect within-country price 
transmission.  
Our study provides a workable solution to account for spatial, other than vertical, price 
heterogeneity, thus overcoming the assumption of a nationally-representative and unique NRP 
which not only neglects the deep causes of imperfect price transmission but, by applying the 
same policy tool to heterogeneous market areas, may further increase price distortions leading 
to inefficient allocation of resources. The analysis can be replicated for other crops included in 
the AgIncentives database as well as for any other country for which detailed household surveys 
are available. 
This exercise provides useful insights for policymakers dealing with the design of nationwide 
and/or regional specific interventions in support of the agricultural sector in developing 
countries. The first one is that some national policies usually put in place to support strategic 
crops such as, for example, import restrictions and government purchases through parastatal 
agencies do not guarantee the same benefits across the entire territory. Without a further 
investigation on the spatial distribution of those benefits, the government risks to misallocate 
the already scarce public resources devoted to the agricultural sector. The second insight relates 
to the decentralization process that is characterizing many developing countries in Asia and 
Africa over the last two decades and the consequent devolution of the agricultural policy to 
sub-national authorities: local policymakers need disaggregated information on the impact of 
national and regional policies (and their interaction) on agricultural price incentives in order to 
design effective and tailor-made interventions. Indeed, the analysis of a nationally-
representative market pathway is not enough to inform agricultural policy reform processes. In 
this respect, the implementation of our methodology would represent a more granular evidence-
based source of information for local policymakers.  
Figure 1 – NRPs at the farm gate by region (2009-2012) 
 
                                          Source: Authors’ calculations 
We ought to emphasize the limitations of our work. First, this is a descriptive exercise, not a 
causal analysis. Second, the selected points of competition may not include all the possible 
pathways for cross-border trade. Third, our reference price relies on official trade statistics, 
whereas informal trade plays an important role in cross-country maize flows in the area.  
Despite these caveats, we consider the methodological contribution to be relevant and it should 
be further refined by future research to fully unleash its substantial policy potential. The 
preliminary empirical evidence provided here points to the inadequacy of current assumptions 
underlying policy interventions, and to the need for a spatially-disaggregated approach which 
better suits the actual functioning of commodity value chains in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Table A.1 – Information on key variables 
                                                          
2 Although these should be considered as unit prices, since they do not account for production inputs and household 
heterogeneity, aggregation at the regional level averages away these differences. As for potential seasonal bias, the fact 
that waves overlap across calendar years makes the issue unlikely to meaningfully affect the results. 
3 Household coordinates have a random offset of 5 kilometres. Our spatial analysis is based on a medium resolution, so 
differences are negligible. 
4 The underlying assumption is that the pathway is the one that minimizes distance to reach the PoCs. 
5 Google Maps distances are computed according to current road infrastructures. This may cause measurement error if 
new roads have been built since the time surveys were implemented. Still, such an approach is an improvement over 
Euclidean distances. 
6 Namely: from the farm gate to the primary market, from primary to secondary markets, and from secondary to wholesale 
markets. As for transport costs from the PoC to the border, we consider only the primary-to secondary and secondary-to-
wholesale segments. The assumed mode of transportation is trucks, except for the FG-primary market segment for which 
bicycles are assumed. 
7
 Busoga region (Iganga and Bugiri, producing zones supplying Kampala) and Sironko, Mbale and Kapchorwa districts 
(from which maize is exported to Kenya through the Busia pathway). 
Variable Notes Source 
Farm-gate prices (FGPs)2 Total value of maize sold in the two rainy seasons before the interview divided by total quantity. World Bank LSMS-ISA 
Free-on-board (FOB) prices 
Average FOB price – partner border countries.  
Computed by dividing the values of annual trade 
volumes by their respective quantities. 
UN Comtrade 
Points of Competition Arua and Mpondwe (for DRC), Gulu (for Sudan) Busia, 
Moroto, and Suam (for Kenya); Kabale (for Rwanda) 
FEWSNET  
Road distances 
Road distances from each household location3 to the 
selected points of competition4; and from each point of 
competition to their respective border.  
Google Maps via R 
(gmapsdistance package)5 
Transport costs 
Computed by multiplying distance in km for the 
corresponding estimate of unit transport cost per ton/km 
of three sub-segments6. 
Estimates of TCs per ton/km for selected 
pathways7 from World Bank (2009), adjusted 
by CPI and assumed as representative 
Profit margins in the 
 PoC – border segment 5 % of wholesale prices from selected cities.  Wholesale prices from RATIN  
Profit margins in the 
 FG - PoC segment 
Only available for the Busia pathway,  
assumed as representative for all. MAFAP 
Handling and processing costs 
(both segments) Same as above. MAFAP 
Taxes and fees 
(both segments) Including Council CESS. MAFAP 
Table A.2 – Regionally-aggregated indicators 
Region     NRPh (%) 
             Mean                                  sd Obs 
2009 
Central  -27.277 40.776 59 
Eastern -17.621 37.82 82 
Northern -17.371 52.173 37 
Western -15.734 54.651 44 
Country -19.772 44.790 222 
2010 
Central  40.555 85.250 154 
Eastern 22.336 113.491 195 
Northern 27.466 76.74 147 
Western 22.495 84.861 114 
Country 28.202 93.449 610 
2011 
Central  134.853 189.182 133 
Eastern 45.002 150.28 142 
Northern 24.233 105.107 122 
Western 63.265 133.144 122 
Country 67.438 154.070 519 
2012 
Central  146.646 268.125 90 
Eastern 91.801 133.586 95 
Northern 66.504 185.366 125 
Western 58.451 83.036 105 
Country 87.638 180.671 415 
Figure A.1 – FEWSNET Production and market flow maps 
 
 
